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Conceptualising the Globalisation 








Globalisation and security vie individually for the status of the least well-
conceptualised, but yet most controversial, of academic and policy-making issues. 
Security has been described as an underdeveloped concept, and globalisation, for a 
variety of reasons and as briefly described below, has been subject to any number of 
definitions. That both issues are so often poorly conceptualised, therefore, only gives 
further grounds for concern when attempting to examine the two in conjunction. For if 
academics and policy-makers alike can agree that globalisation and security are the 
two most pressing of contemporary international issues, but still experience difficulty 
even in analysing them in separation, then the prospects for understanding their 
intersection and the ‘globalisation-security nexus’ appear to be poor. In these 
uncertain circumstances, we all should fear for our security. 
 
There is thus an urgent need to define and interconnect the twin issues of globalisation 
and security. Indeed, it could be argued that a number of pioneering attempts have 
already been made to investigate the relationship between globalisation and security, 
in terms of its creation of new security actors, problems and responses.1 However, 
although valuable in providing a starting point and emergent framework for 
consideration of the globalisation-security nexus, these attempts have tended to lack a 
strong empirical basis, and geographical and historically contingent focus. Such a 
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focus is important because globalisation is likely to differ in its security impact 
between different regional contexts and different sovereign-states. Conversely, those 
studies which have concentrated on non-traditional security issues, such as economic 
dislocation, migration and crime, within the actual context of the Asia-Pacific have 
usually lacked a strong conceptual basis for explaining the reasons as to why it should 
be that globalisation has had a deep impact upon the sovereign-states of this particular 
region. 
 
All of this argues that there is a need to combine the study of globalisation and 
security, but that this also should be carried out through the balanced application of 
analytical frameworks to particular regional cases. Hence, this article attempts, in a 
number of stages, to both build upon the existing globalisation-security nexus 
literature and to extend it to the case of the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War 
(or post-globalisation) period. The first of these stages is to define more fully the 
essence of the term globalisation, and the inherent problems that it presents broadly 
for the existing international order. The second stage is to examine the impact of 
globalisation upon security in both generic terms and specific regional terms in the 
Asia-Pacific by focussing on its generation of new referent objects of security, threats, 
and policy responses. The third stage is then to seek to explain the differentially heavy 
impact of globalisation in the Asia-Pacific as the outcome of the internal and external 
structural weaknesses of the sovereign-states of the region, in turn a product of the 
historical intertwining of the processes of globalisation, bipolarisation and 
decolonisation; and how these state vulnerabilities will continue to hamper the efforts 
of policy-makers of the region to respond to the challenges of globalisation.  
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Conceptions of globalisation 
 
Definitions 
Globalisation is a notoriously slippery concept and has produced a bewildering 
number of definitions. Globalisation has been defined variously as universalisation 
(the expansion of cultures across the globe); internationalisation (increased interaction 
and interdependence between peoples in different states); Westernisation or 
Americanisation (the homogenisation of the world along Western or US standards); 
and liberalisation (the spread of deregulated forces of technology, production, trade, 
and finance across borders). Many of these definitions are indeed facets of 
globalisation—both in terms of its causation and eventual outcomes. But these 
definitions still fail to capture the qualitatively different nature of globalisation from 
other processes and phenomena associated with the interaction of social forces on a 
global scale. Globalisation represents a qualitatively different process due to its 
essential de-territorialisation, or stated in reverse, supra-territorialisation of social 
interaction.2 That is to say, globalisation is a process which increasingly reconfigures 
social space away from and beyond notions of delineated territory, and transcends 
existing physical and human borders imposed upon social interaction. For instance, 
global financial transactions, facilitated by information technology, can now often 
operate without reference to physical territorial distance or human-imposed territorial 
barriers. It is important to avoid the type of 'hyper-globalisation' thesis which views 
the world as moving towards a condition of being totally 'borderless'. For it is 
apparent that there is considerable territorial 'drag' upon the free-flow of globalisation 
forces, that not all forms of economic interaction such as trade and labour migration 
are as fully globalised as finance, that there are wide disparities in the degree of 
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globalisation across different regions of the world, and that there is both resistance to 
and reversibility in the process itself. Nevertheless, globalisation as a process of 
supra-territorialisation is increasingly affecting large sections of the world, and must 
be acknowledged as a markedly different (although certainly not unrelated) process to 
those other definitions of social interaction noted above. Hence, even though 
universalism, internationalisaion, westernisation and liberalisation may eventually 
result in globalisation, the fact that they may not necessarily be entirely detached from 
territorialisation means that they remain on a qualitatively different level to the 
inherently supra-territorial phenomena of globalisation. 
 
Challenges to the inter-sovereign-state security order 
The phenomena of globalisation as supra-territorialisation and the reconfiguration of 
social space carries significant implications for existing forms of social organisation, 
and, most importantly in the case of security issues, the dominant position of the 
nation-state (or far more accurately for many states, sovereign-state) within the 
existing globality. Needless to say, the state with its exclusive jurisdiction—or in 
other words, sovereignty—over a particular social and territorial space, delineated by 
a combination of physical geography and most especially human construction, has 
been the basic unit for the division of global space in the modern era. States in the 
past have attempted in theory and practice to exercise sovereign control over all forms 
of social interaction in the political, economic, and security dimensions, both within 
and between their territorial borders. Quite clearly, and as elucidated below with 
reference to the Asia-Pacific, not all states throughout history have been able to 
exercise the same degree of sovereign control over all forms of social interaction. 
Nevertheless, sovereign-states rooted in territorial notions of social space have been 
 4
the prime unit for facilitating, impeding and mediating interaction between the 
societal groups, organisations, and citizens and other categories of collective and 
individual societal units contained within their borders. Hence, to date, global social 
space has been primarily international, or inter-sovereign-state, social space.  
 
However, the inherent nature of globalisation as a process which transcends and 
overrides territoriality as the dominant principle for the organisation of social space 
now poses a fundamental challenge to the sovereign-state as the basic social unit 
which exemplifies and undergirds this very territorial principle. Sovereign-states must 
contend with the freer flow of social forces on a global scale which move with 
declining reference to the previous limitations and channels imposed by state borders. 
This increasing porosity of state borders, relative decline in the de facto sovereign 
authority of states over social interaction, and corresponding increased exposure of 
'internal' societal groupings to 'external forces' (or even indeed the removal of the 
traditional domestic-international divide to create an inter-mestic arena for social 
interchange) has a number of outcomes for security discussed below. For if global 
social space has been primarily international or inter-sovereign-state space for much 
of the modern era, then the security order as one aspect of social interaction has been 
primarily built around the inter-state order. But it is clear that the security order is 
now pitted against the phenomenon of globalisation which generates security issues 
diametrically opposed to and often beyond the limits of sovereign-state authority.  
 
Globalisation's impact on security in the Asia-Pacific 
If we view globalisation as a process which is driven forward by political choice in 
favour of liberal economics, and results in forms of social interaction which transcend 
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territorial borders and state sovereignty, then it is possible to conceive of its impact on 
security in a number of areas. These involve both the vertical extension of security in 
terms of the referent objects of security, and the horizontal extension in terms of 
security threat dimensions.3  
 
Levels of referent objects 
One noticeable impact of globalisation has been to accentuate the concept, which has 
preexisted in certain contexts, that the state's position as the prime referent object of 
security is now rivalled by other societal groupings. The study of security has 
traditionally rested upon the assumption that the security of the institution of the 
sovereign-state can be necessarily conflated with the security of the 'nation' or general 
population and citizenry contained within that state's borders. Hence, in the past and 
still in the contemporary period, the tendency of security studies has been to argue 
that the survival of states, as institutions which are created as the embodiment of 
collective national will, and which serve as the point of interface or 'gatekeeper' to 
shield their citizenry and populations from external threats, is indivisible from the 
survival of peoples or nations. The result has been to produce a view of security 
which concentrates not just upon states as the key referent objects of security, but also 
mainly upon the external aspects of state security. For the traditional ‘realist’ 
paradigm, then, security is concerned with external threats to states, and especially 
those threats imposed upon states by inter-sovereign-state conflict—the natural 
outcome of friction in an international system dominated by states all seeking to 
ensure the security of their own populations from external challenges.  
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The identity and role of sovereign-states as the referent object of security, 
undoubtedly remains central to our understanding of security in the contemporary era, 
and this may be especially so for those states which can assert with conviction the 
character of being nation-states, marked by a cohesive association between the 
security interests of state as an institution and its 'national' population as a whole. In 
other instances, though, the assumption that the security of states as referent objects 
approximates with that of the population or nation at large, and consequently that all 
states focus upon external threat perceptions, is inaccurate. The tendency of 
traditional security paradigms to 'black box' internal state dynamics mean that 
inevitably they neglect also those internal threats which arise from a fundamental 
divergence between the perceived security interests of states themselves and segments 
of their population. Newly-established and late-starter sovereign-states with borders 
cutting across and encompassing a variety of national and ethnic groups are 
particularly sensitive to internal security threats. It is often the case that such states 
confront substantial minority ethnic groups which reject the definition of nation and 
state emanating from the government. As a result, these groups seek instead to secure 
autonomy or to secede, and may often launch insurgency movements, so challenging 
the integrity and internal stability of the state.  
 
Another internal security problem, often independent of, but also at times inter-linked 
with and capable of reinforcing ethnic separatism, is that of a crisis of the state's 
political legitimacy and leadership amongst the general population. In certain states, 
the majority of the population may support the cause of national and state integrity, 
but come to reject the political legitimacy of the government system or governing 
regime and elite. The antagonism of the general population towards the political 
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regime may be aroused by a variety of factors centering on perceptions of 
misgovernment, including the management of the economy, issues of crime and 
corruption, and the commitment to stable or democratic government. The outcome 
can be political turmoil, violent demonstrations, and even revolution. If prolonged, 
political unrest can bring the prospect of factionalism and civil war. Most explosive of 
all is a combination of political crisis and ethnic separatism which can threaten the 
internal disintegration of a state. As outlined below, many states in the Asia-Pacific, 
as developing sovereign-states, but often only partially 'nation'-states, are subject to 
these twin problems of ethnic separatism and political legitimacy. Hence, these states 
have focussed much of their security policy-making energy on dealing with internal 
rather than external security threats. 
 
Therefore, the argument that the state cannot be considered as the exclusive, or even 
main, referent object of security, and that there is a need to give our attention to 
problems of the internal security of societal groupings contained within the state's 
sovereign territory, is not new. Globalisation's impact, though, has been to heighten 
this consciousness of the potential divisibility of the security of the sovereign-state 
from that of its internal societal elements. Globalisation as a process which transcends 
territorial and sovereign boundaries, and thus which penetrates with relative ease the 
internal social space of the state, inevitably also brings with it security effects that 
diminish the role of the state as the barrier to external threats and that impact directly 
and differentially upon internal societal groups. For example, globalisation has such 
an impact in the dimension of economic security, whereby the free flow of market 
forces across borders, and the accompanying wealth creation but also economic 
dislocation that it engenders, undercuts the ability of the sovereign-state to act as the 
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principal arbiter of the economic welfare of its internal society. Globalisation's 
capacity to strip the supposed protection of the state away from societal groups and 
citizens then helps to explain why there has been a significant shift in security 
perspectives away from those fixated on the state, and towards the irreducible, yet 
ultimate, level of individual and 'human security'.4
 
The East Asian financial crisis illustrates well many of these security effects of 
globalisation. The crisis from 1997 onwards produced a set of economic costs for 
societal groups (ethnic and economic) and individual citizens that many of the states 
of the region found themselves unable at first to mitigate and redistribute. In these 
circumstances, even though the governmental apparatus of the states of the region 
remained intact, societal groups and individuals began again to view certain states as 
redundant frameworks for the preservation of their economic and political security 
interests, and so looked to detach themselves from political dependence upon them. 
The result for many of the states has been to produce short and longer term crises of 
legitimacy. In Malaysia, differences over economic policy responses to the financial 
crisis triggered an elite power struggle between Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed 
and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibraham from 1997 to 1999, which then spilled 
over into civil violence between the police authorities and rival political support 
groups. The effect of the crisis has also been to re-expose differences in economic 
status amongst the Malay majority and Indian and Chinese minority groups which the 
government had attempted to suppress since the race riots of 13 May 1969 through 
ethnic distributive and high growth policies—leading to renewed religious and ethnic 
tensions, and occasional inter-communal violence, as with a number of deaths of 
Malays and Indians in March 2001 in troubles near Kuala Lumpur. 
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 Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the general enfeeblement of the central government and 
military apparatus caused by the shock of the financial crisis has opened an ugly 
‘Pandora’s box’ of internal security problems at the societal group and individual 
level. The financial crisis undermined export-oriented high-speed growth policies that 
had supported the state-building efforts of President Suharto’s New Order and which 
were designed to integrate Indonesia’s multifarious ethnic and religious groupings. In 
turn, the conversion of the financial crisis into a full-blown economic crisis and the 
further impoverishment of large sections of Indonesian society, which had come to 
expect economic liberalisation to bring relative improvements in living standards, 
generated not only a tragedy of economic and human security but also set in train a 
political regime crisis. This political crisis, accompanied by mass violence on the 
streets of Jakarta between the police and pro-democracy groups, led to fall of the 
government of Suharto in May 1998, and formed the backdrop for the political 
turmoil of President Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency until July 2001. 
Simultaneously, the economic crisis and the perceived economic inequalities that it 
highlighted between the Javanese majority and Chinese minority sparked ‘pogroms’ 
of elements of the former and the Indonesian military against the latter in May 1998.  
 
As is well known, the financial crisis has also formed the occasion for the security 
situation in other regions of Indonesia to spiral out of control. Long-term economic 
tensions between Dayaks and transmigrant Madurese, heightened by the impact of the 
crisis, has produced violent clashes and thousands of refugees in Sambas, West 
Kalimantan Province. The economic crisis and related social instability have also 
promoted conditions for the reemergence of religious violence. From 1999 onwards, 
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Muslims and Christians have been involved in inter-communal violence in Ambon, 
Maluku province, resulting in thousands of deaths and widespread destruction of 
property. Meanwhile, political confusion in Jakarta was one factor which encouraged 
the Fretilin pro-independence movement in East Timor and enabled the former 
Portuguese colonies’ eventual breakaway from Indonesia. However, this was only 
achieved after considerable bloodshed in clashes between pro-independence 
supporters and anti-independence militias backed by the Indonesian military; the 
displacement of up to three quarters of East Timor’s population; the destruction of 
ninety percent of the province’s physical infrastructure; and the eventual intervention 
of a UN-sanctioned and Australian-led International Force in East Timor from 
September 1999 onwards. The Indonesian state at the same time has been faced with 
revitalised autonomy or independence movements in West Irian Jaya, and Aceh—
emboldened by the decline of the formerly highly centralised state created under 
Suharto and seeking greater political freedom from a state which they no longer view 
as serving their political, economic or security interests. The Free Aceh Movement 
has proved particularly virulent, escalating the guerilla war which it has been engaged 
in since 1973, and intent on recovering control of the province’s rich oil and gas 
reserves. The knock-on effects upon inter-sovereign-state security of the Indonesian 
state’s potential disintegration has been shown by the East Timor crisis, but the 
problem of Aceh has also indicated the wider security risks involved, with the guerilla 
movement’s successful disruption a large proportion of Japanese LNG imports from 
the province. 
 
Dimensions of threat: economic, environmental, military 
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Globalisation's most obvious influence has been its integrative and disintegrative 
economic characteristics, and the consequent impetus its gives to problems of the 
economic and then the military security of states and their societal constituents. The 
spread of liberal market forces is capable of bringing economic inclusion and 
interdependence, which may contribute to social stability and peaceful relations 
internally and externally (a form of 'democratic peace' argument). Nevertheless, the 
disintegrative effects of globalisation can simultaneously contribute to insecurity in a 
number of ways.  
 
Firstly, globalisation can produce economic exclusion for states and individuals. This 
may be marked by disparities of welfare, which can then feed through into military 
tension amongst states in an attempt to wrest economic benefits from others, or result 
in internal unrest within states. In the case of the Asia-Pacific, this type of problem 
can be seen in North Korea’s loss of access to the socialist economic sphere following 
the end of the Cold War, and its exclusion, both self- and externally-imposed, from 
the rapidly globalising political economy of the region. North Korea has then been 
presented with a new security dilemma by the globalisation-security nexus. For on the 
one hand, North Korea’s reluctance to reform and integrate itself into the region will 
only exacerbate the deep-seated structural economic crisis that it has experienced 
since the latter stages of the Cold War which could lead to the implosion of its 
political regime. On the other hand, though, the North Korea leadership is also aware 
that the economic liberalisation even on a modest scale would expose its closed 
political economy to the shocks of globalisation, transcend previously imposed 
sovereign barriers to the political control of its internal society, and also threaten the 
collapse of the regime. Hence, faced with the twin risks of this dilemma, the North 
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Korean regime has attempted to steer a middle path with a limited policy of opening 
to the outside world but on terms that it has sought in part to dictate. In practice this 
has meant that North Korea has utilised its remaining military assets in a strategy of 
brinkmanship to extract economic concessions in the form of food aid, but also 
preferential access to energy, financial aid, investment and international economic 
institutions, from the surrounding powers.5 In many instances, North Korea’s strategy 
has succeeded brilliantly, maneuvering around larger powers to gain short-term 
economic concessions (even if over the longer term North Korea is effectively 
mortgaging its remaining military assets and setting itself on a trajectory towards 
integration into the region), and has been a demonstration of how the fear of 
globalisation and the related problems of economic exclusion, can also generate 
increased regional military tensions.  
 
Secondly, globalisation is capable of re-mapping economic and social space, with the 
frequent result that economic interdependency can pull actors and regions away from 
the defined territorial space of the sovereign-state and towards regions incorporated 
within other states. In these instances, the rise of regionalisation can lead to the 
disintegration of state structures, with unforeseen consequences for internal and 
external security. These problems in the Asia-Pacific are encapsulated in speculation 
about the breakaway from the Russia of its Far East provinces resulting from their 
desire for greater control over their own natural resources, and the possible 
‘deconstruction’ of China as economic liberalisation undermines the capability of the 
centre to govern the local provinces. Moreover, China’s economic liberalisation has 
created problems of security not only between centre and provinces, but also within 
the provinces themselves, as China’s gradual abandonment of socialist principles 
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erodes the basis for the ‘iron rice bowl’ which ensured political stability and was one 
of its greatest achievements in terms of providing human security for the bulk of its 
population.   
 
Thirdly, globalisation can generate economic rivalry amongst states, transnational 
corporations (TNC), societal organisations and individuals for scare natural resources; 
again often threatening to spill over into military conflict. The most prominent 
example of globalisation spurring on high speed economic growth and competition 
for natural resources is China’s territorial aspirations in the South China Sea and 
desire to acquire the energy resources necessary for continued economic expansion. 
The potential that this creates for military conflict between China and a number of 
Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) states, and the risks that it poses for 
other regional states such as Japan using the Sea Lines of Communication in the 
South China Sea, are well documented. In addition, rapid economic growth, which 
brings with it expanded domestic food consumption and often population growth, has 
given greater force to disputes amongst ASEAN states such as Thailand, Vietnam and 
Malaysia over fishing grounds in Exclusive Economic Zones; to territorial disputes 
involving fish stocks such as that involving Japan and South Korea over the 
Takeshima (Tok-do) Islands; and to competition for precious fresh water resources in 
areas such as the Mekong Delta.6
 
Fourthly, globalisation can often result in economic dislocation, poverty, and financial 
crises. All this can lead to insecurity for states, societal groups and individuals, which 
can again feed into social instability within and amongst states and possible armed 
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conflict. The discussion above of the problems of many ASEAN states in the wake of 
the financial crisis of 1997 provides examples of these types of security problems.  
 
Moreover, sitting in between these integrative and disintegrative economic effects of 
globalisation are those security problems connected with transnational or trans-
sovereign crime. Globalisation promotes trans-sovereign crime because economic 
integration and disintegration in tandem create both supply and demand factors for 
those actors engaged in criminal activities. By this it is meant that economic 
dislocation and disparities within a certain state or societal grouping creates incentives 
to engage in wealth-generating activities by the supply of illicit products such as 
narcotics or arms. In turn, globalisation's creation of economic wealth in certain areas 
of the world creates a market and demand for the supply of these economic 
commodities. Crime as an economic activity and the trade in 'illicit' commodities is 
clearly not a new phenomena. Indeed, in the past the chief suppliers of narcotics have 
been sovereign-states themselves, the opium trade in East Asia being one notable 
example. But economic globalisation, facilitated by transport and information 
technology, has enabled crime organisations to mimic the behaviour of TNCs, to 
move with still greater ease across deregulated economic space, and thus to impinge 
even more directly upon the welfare of other societal groups and individuals.7 Hence, 
in the Asia-Pacific, rapid economic growth and the establishment of improved 
communications has led to an expansion in narcotics trafficking in terms of both 
volume and sophistication since the end of the Cold War. The breakdown of previous 
Cold War barriers to economic interaction amongst many states of the region and the 
new wealth of many citizens has increased the market for narcotics. Conversely, the 
financial crisis and economic downturn since 1997 has also acted to make drug 
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trafficking an economic lifeline for the citizens of many ASEAN states. The 
traditional concentration of the narcotics trade in the Golden Triangle of Burma, 
Thailand and Laos has transcended sovereign-state borders to include a wider 
economic area that includes also much of Southern China. Burmese Shan, Thai and 
Chinese ethnic organised crime groups have remained engaged in the trade, but grown 
in sophistication through the exploitation of information technology and improved 
transport infrastructure.8 The security risks of the regionalisation and globalisation of 
the narcotics trade in the Asia-Pacific are demonstrated by the health and welfare 
effects of drug addiction on millions of users in the region, as well as the economic 
distortion and systemic corruption it engenders in many of the regional states. 
Similarly, the drugs trade has not been the only area of organised crime to have 
expanded in the region as a result of globalisation processes. Studies have 
demonstrated that piracy has increased in recent years in Southeast Asia, driven by the 
increased opportunities of the expansion of shipping traffic resulting from the region’s 
rapid economic growth, but also the increased motivation to engage in crime on the 
part of those groups which have been marginalised in the process of economic 
globalisation.9   
 
The other most notable security effects of economic globalisation are environmental. 
Although in the past socialist systems have been responsible for some of the worst 
examples of environment degradation, the spread of liberal economic globalisation 
has arguably taken these problems to new heights. Liberal capitalism's vast and 
largely unimpeded appetite for natural resources, and the pollution that usually 
results, not only threatens directly the health of groups of individuals in various 
regions (soil, water and air pollution), but also threatens indirectly the existence of 
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humankind through the total destruction (global warming, sea level changes) of the 
biosphere. The impact of globalisation and economic liberalisation on environmental 
security in Asia-Pacific region can be seen with concerns about how China’s 
economic growth may impose massive pollution costs on its own citizens and those of 
neighbouring states, and the impact of forest fires across the Indonesian archipelago 
in 1997 and 1998. The fires in Kalimantan and Sumatra were the product of high-
speed development policies which allowed unregulated logging and forest clearance 
and generated a ‘haze’ that affected the health of literally millions of Indonesian, 
Malaysian and Singaporean citizens. In many ways, the fires represented the apogee 
of the globalisation-security nexus as they functioned to threaten human security, in 
complete transcendence of sovereign-state borders, and revealed the inability to 
compartmentalise international and domestic security in an era of globalisation. 
 
Globalisation and the future security agenda in the Asia-Pacific 
 
Globalisation’s differentially heavy impact in the Asia-Pacific 
This article has identified a host of problems in the Asia-Pacific which illustrate the 
crucial interconnection between globalisation and security. These problems are 
exemplified by the East Asian financial crisis which has threatened to impact upon all 
levels of security from that of the state to the individual, and across all dimensions 
from the economic, to the environmental, and to the military. Moreover, the fact that 
the financial crisis has had such severe and prolonged security effects in the Asia-
Pacific since 1997, in contrast to other financial crises which occurred near 
simultaneously in Russia and Latin America, argues that the globalisation-security 
nexus may be having a differentially heavy impact in this region compared to others. 
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In turn, these observations raise two crucial and interrelated issues that form the focus 
of the remaining part of this article. The first is the reasons for why the Asia-Pacific 
region has been and will continue to be particularly prone to the security effects of 
globalisation, and the second is a consideration of whether the states and policy-
makers are equipped to deal effectively with the challenges of the unfolding post-
globalisation security agenda. 
. 
Vulnerable sovereign-states: decolonisation, bipolarisation and globalisation 
As stated in the introduction to this article, it is important to understand the 
relationship between globalisation and security through reference to both generic 
analytical frameworks and specific regional contexts. The first section of this article 
argued that the essence of globalisation as a security problem is to be found in its 
transcendence of barriers to interaction across social space, and hence its challenge to 
the sovereign-state as the existing basis for the global security order. The forces of 
globalisation quickly search out any inconsistencies and flaws in the structure of 
sovereign-states, and can prise open their external security barriers. Consequently, 
this suggests that in order to comprehend the reasons for the differential impact of 
globalisation across regions then it is necessary to examine the differential nature of 
sovereign-states in each region, and their ability to absorb and withstand the security 
shocks associated with globalisation.  
 
In the case of the Asia-Pacific, it can be seen that they are inherently vulnerable to the 
impact of globalisation due to the dual influence of the processes of decolonisation 
and bipolarisation upon the state-building process in the post-war period. The effect 
of decolonisation upon the Asia-Pacific region was to create states modelled in theory 
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along the lines of the sovereign and nation-states of their former colonial masters, but 
which in practice have not always conformed to these ideals. In many instances, the 
idea of the sovereign-state came before or diverged from that of the nation-state: 
shown by the fact that the territorial and sovereign space of states in the region was 
often delineated along former colonial borders which had been drawn arbitrarily and 
in contradistinction to trans-border ties of ethnicity and religion, and which continued 
to incorporate minority groups brought in under colonial migratory policies—
problems particularly salient in many ASEAN states. These contradictions between 
sovereign space and societal composition clearly weakened from the start the internal 
political cohesion of states in the region, and laid the ground for the potential 
divisibility between the security interests of the state and its societal constituents. 
Moreover, the common legacy of distorted development from the colonial period also 
placed these states in a disadvantageous economic position to maintain their internal 
stability. Therefore, the preoccupation of many states in the Asia-Pacific region since 
the post-colonial has been to preserve their internal integrity by advancing the process 
of state-building, and particularly in the economic sphere, as a means to reconcile 
these structural contradictions.10  
 
The problematic position of newly-established sovereign-states in the region was 
further compounded either during or immediately after the decolonisation phase by 
the impact of the onset of the Cold War. The bifurcation of the region between the 
competing ideologies and political economies of the socialist and capitalist blocs was 
to create a legacy of military confrontation which has endured in many parts of the 
region, such as the Korean Peninsula, to this day. Nevertheless, perhaps more 
important when considering the post-Cold War and post-globalisation security 
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agendas is the effect of the Cold War upon the state building-agendas and 
development of the political economies of many of the states in the region. The 
socialist camp, consisting of the USSR, China, North Korea, Vietnam and Laos, 
initially under the auspices of the USSR and later rendered asunder internally by the 
Sino-Soviet split, created an alternative developmental economic system to that of 
liberal capitalism which ensured the security of its members, but also which was 
fundamentally vulnerable when exposed to the forces of liberal capitalism at the end 
of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the capitalist camp, consisting of many of the original 
ASEAN states, South Korea, and centred on the US and increasingly Japan, enabled 
its members to evolve distinctive models of developmental capitalism, and to use 
economic growth to mitigate problems of internal instability. On the other hand, 
though, the system, revolving as it did around a form of proto-globalisation which 
was designed to support the security interests of the US and thus which insulated 
these states to some degree from full competition, also had a distinct effect on the 
future resilience of these states in the face of economic liberalisation.11 The 
developmental states of the region were provided with preferential access to 
technology and the markets of the US and West, whilst simultaneously being able to 
restrict access to their own markets.  
 
Therefore, the overlapping processes of decolonisation and bipolarisation have had a 
significant impact upon the development of the sovereign-states of the Asia-Pacific, 
and their ability to respond to the process of globalisation. Firstly, these processes 
have created states marked by internal contradictions between the delineation of 
territorial space and societal composition, and a near ineradicable and potential 
divisibility between the proclaimed security interests of these states and large sections 
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of their citizenry. Secondly, they have created states either fundamentally unprepared 
to cope with global economic forces as in the case of as North Korea, or states such as 
those of ASEAN driven by the need to exploit the benefits of liberal capitalism to 
paper over the political and security cracks in their own societies, but which have 
been insulated in the past from the full effects of capitalism's tendency towards 
periodic crises. The end of the Cold War and the declining incentives on the part of 
the US to provide special economic dispensations is also increasingly exposing the 
states of the region to fully-fledged modes of liberal capitalism and their attendant 
security costs. In sum, then, the Asia-Pacific has been and continues to be 
characterised by states especially vulnerable to those forces which attack territorial 
sovereignty, generate external economic shocks, and frustrate state-building 
agendas—the very conditions which globalisation is capable of creating and 
exploiting to the detriment of security.  
 
Responses and policy implications 
The above discussion of the inherent structural weaknesses of many of the states of 
the Asia-Pacific and their resultant inherent vulnerability to the globalisation-security 
nexus leads discussion to the crucial issue of whether they will be capable of 
responding to globalisation’s future challenges. Detailed examination of these issues 
will form the basis of future studies, but the aim here is simply to stress two key 
points about the evolving globalisation-security agenda in the Asia-Pacific. The first 
is that the nature of globalisation as often an economic phenomenon means that 
military power alone is not sufficient to meet its security demands. There is a 
continued need for comprehensive approaches to security which employ military and 
economic power in balanced combination. The second point is that globalisation’s 
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essentially supra-territorial phenomena means that it cannot be responded to within 
the traditional confines of the territorial state. Globalisation’s ability to circumvent 
territorial boundaries means that all its associated security problems, including 
economic dislocation, crime and environmental pollution, are trans-sovereign in 
character. States are then faced with trans-sovereign problems that require multi-
national and, most controversially, trans-sovereign responses.  
 
The evidence from the responses of Asia-Pacific states to recent security problems is 
that they continue to understand fully the importance of the need for a comprehensive 
approach—demonstrated with Japan’s ‘Human Security’ initiatives in response to the 
East Asian financial crisis since 1998. But it is not clear if the policy-makers of the 
region are yet ready to fully contemplate trans-sovereign responses to many extant 
security issues. The inability of the ASEAN states to respond to the trans-sovereign 
problem of the Indonesian ‘haze’, and the divisions evident in the organisation over 
the question of external intervention in the East Timor crisis, indicate that they still 
hold the norms of exclusive territorial sovereignty and non-intervention to be largely 
sacrosanct, even at considerable cost to the human security of their own and other 
states’ populations. Again, this reluctance to breach the principle of sovereignty is 
explained by their hard-fought efforts for decolonisation and state-building in the 
Cold War period, and the states of the region may be able to compensate with 
improved multilateral coordination and adaptive forms of governance such as the 
ASEAN+3, and new functional norms such as ‘flexible’ engagement. However, 
policy-makers will also need to consider that the maintenance of exclusive 
sovereignty may prove untenable in an era of globalisation and that they will have to 
support more actively policies of humanitarian intervention and the explicit criticism 
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of each other’s ‘internal’ security affairs, if they are to address effectively the 
globalisation-security nexus. 
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